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Most-Favored-Nation Treatment of Imports to
the United States from the U.S.S.R.
STANLEY D. METZGER*
No aspect of international trade between the United States and
the Soviet Union has received more attention in recent years than the
question of most-favored-nation treatment of Soviet imports to the
United States. Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment of imports
means that goods imported from a country enjoying such treatment
cannot be subjected to customs duties or other charges in connection
with importation, or rules and formalities, less favorable than those
which are imposed upon imported goods originating in any other
country. It is a rule, whether established by domestic law or by inter-
national agreement or both, against discriminatory treatment of im-
ports based upon their place of origin.
Since 1951, Soviet imports to the United States have not enjoyed
most-favored-nation treatment;' they are subjected to the duties
specified in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, not to those duties
as they have been reduced in trade agreements concluded since the
1934 Trade Agreements Act.2 In 1972, in conjunction with the conclu-
sion of a Lend-Lease Settlement Agreement, the executive authori-
ties of the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated a Trade
Agreement which provides for most-favored-nation treatment of So-
viet imports with respect to customs duties, their internal taxation
or distribution in the United States, any charges upon transfers of
payments for their importation, and any rules or formalities in
connection with their importation.3 The Trade Agreement also pro-
vides, however, that it will not enter into force until written notices
of acceptance are exchanged,4 and this cannot take place until the
U.S. Congress changes domestic law to conform to the agreement.
Payments to the United States of installments on the lend-lease obli-
gation are deferred, following the initial payments, until the Trade
Agreement enters into force.5 As of this writing MFN treatment is
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1. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, § 5, 65 Stat. 73; 19 U.S.C. § 1362
(1952).
2. Id.
3. Agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Regarding Trade, Oct. 18, 1972, art. 1, para. 1, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 595,
596 (1972).
4. Id., art. 9, para. 1.
5. Agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics Regarding Settlement of Lend-Lease, Reciprocal Aid and Claims done Oct. 18,
1972, art. 4(b)(1)(i), 23 U.S.T. 2910, T.I.A.S. No 7878 (1972).
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still not accorded to Soviet imports.
This paper outlines the origins and status of the present discrimi-
natory legal regime,' and the likely economic consequences of adop-
tion of an MFN system. Also touched upon are some of the problems
which appear to beset efforts to effectuate such a change.
I. THE LEGAL REGIME
MFN treatment was accorded to Soviet imports to the United
States between 1937 and 1951.6 Under the Trade Agreements Act of
1934, as amended and extended until 1951, any duty or other import
restriction or duty-free treatment proclaimed in carrying out any
trade agreement under the Trade Agreements program was required
as a matter of law to be applied to products of "all foreign countries,
whether imported directly or indirectly."7 This meant that tariff re-
ductions negotiated with other countries were applied in like situa-
tions to imports from the U.S.S.R. While MFN treatment could be
suspended whenever a country discriminated against American
goods, such suspensions occurred infrequently, and not with respect
to U.S.S.R. imports.'
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, which was con-
sidered and enacted during the active hostilities of the Korean War,
required the President to withdraw the application of MFN treat-
ment from products of the U.S.S.R. and certain other countries under
its "domination or control." The Administration had not proposed
this amendment of the 1934 Act. It was first proposed by the minority
of the Ways and Means Committee of the United States House of
Representatives during the Committee's consideration of the exten-
sion bill, but only in respect of future tariff restrictions; it was re-
jected by the majority of the Committee, and then voted into the bill
by the full House. When the bill reached the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, Secretary of State Acheson testified against it.? The "effects
of this amendment would be virtually nil," he pointed out, for it
"would have little effect upon the salability of dutiable Soviet prod-
ucts," and "would not affect the salability of their duty-free products
at all."' 0 The Senate nonetheless rejected his position and even ex-
tended the House prohibition to all trade concessions, past or future;
the resulting Act reflected the Senate position. At the same time the
6. MFN treatment was extended to the Soviet Union by Executive Agreement on
Aug. 4, 1937, 50 Stat. 619; E.A.S. No. 105. It was last extended in 1942, 56 Stat. 1500;
E.A.S. No. 253.
7. Trade Agreements Act of 1934, § 350(a)(2), 48 Stat. 944.
8. See T.D. 47600, 68 Treas. Dec. 470 (1935) (Germany); T.D. 48947, 71 Treas.
Dec. 707 (1937) (Australia).
9. Hearings on H.R. 1612 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess., 3-10 (1951).
10. Id. at 8.
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Senate adopted an amendment prohibiting imports of Soviet mink,
sable, and other fur skins, again over Administration opposition. This
too found its way into the Act.
There is no doubt that the reason for the 1951 Congressional
action denying MFN treatment to Soviet imports was "political," as
Secretary Kissinger characterized it in testimony to the Senate Fi-
nance Committee in March 1974. 1 Congress was taking an opportun-
ity at hand, the consideration of a trade bill, to indicate its strong
disapproval of Soviet support for North Korea, then in combat with
American armed forces, despite its awareness of the extremely lim-
ited economic effect of its action. Indeed, this is but one of many
examples in the area of controls over East-West trade during the past
twenty-five years in which the Congress has taken a position far more
restrictive than that of the Administration.' 2 In more general terms,
they represent a familiar occurrence in American politics. Substan-
tial domestic public opinion concerning an international matter
which differs markedly from dominant official opinion relating there-
to is reflected by Congressional opposition to administration policy.
The statutory denial of MFN treatment of Soviet imports was
reiterated in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act," and thus has continued
for the past twenty-three years. Successive administrations have
sought for ways to restore it, though with varying degrees of intensity.
The Eisenhower Administration indicated, in 1959-60 discussions
with the U.S.S.R. concerning a Lend-Lease settlement (one of a num-
ber held from time to time without result until 1972), that an atmos-
phere favorable to such a change could be created if a reasonable
settlement could be negotiated. A bill proposed in the mid-1960s by
the Johnson Administration which would have authorized restoration
of MFN treatment, based on similar conditions, failed to secure suffi-
cient Congressional support to be reported out of committee.
Finally, in 1973, following the 1972 negotiations of a Trade
Agreement, a Lend-Lease settlement, and related agreements reflect-
ing "detente" in Soviet-American relations, the Nixon Administra-
tion sought similar authority in order to effectuate these agreements.
As in 1951, however, political considerations have proved to be a
formidable obstacle to the Administration's proposal, in this instance
primarily considerations relating to Soviet restrictions upon Jewish
11. 2 Hearings on H.R. 10710 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong.,
2d S'ess. 455 (1974).
12. One of the rare contrary examples took place in 1969 when the Administration
opposed Senators Muskie and Mondale in their successful effort to loosen controls over
U.S. exports to the Soviet Union and certain other countries. The Administration
wished to "link" this relaxation to other matters affecting Soviet-American relations.
13. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 231, 76 Stat. 876, 19 U.S.C. § 1861.
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emigration. While these restrictions are more closely connected with
internal affairs than was Soviet support of North Korean hostilities
in 1951, they cannot be considered to be wholly internal. They are
affected with an international concern, the right to emigrate having
been one of the human rights [Article 13(2)] proclaimed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 as a "common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."' 4
On October 3, 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee
reported out H.R. 10710, the "Trade Reform Act of 1973," with
changes in Title IV (relating to MFN treatment for Soviet imports)
which would have imposed added conditions upon the authority of
the President to accord MFN status to Soviet imports.'5 Under the
bill, MFN treatment cannot be provided to the products of any "non-
market economy" country that 1) denies its citizens the right or op-
portunity to emigrate, 2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigra-
tion or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for
any purpose or cause whatsoever, or 3) imposes more than a nominal
tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence
of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.
MFN treatment can be accorded only after the President submits a
report to the Congress "indicating that such country is not in viola-
tion of" points one, two, or three above.'"
The House of Representatives acted favorably upon H.R. 10710
on December 11, 1973, following two days of debate. However, before
doing so it adopted by a vote of 319 to 80 an amendment to Title
IV-the so-called Vanik Amendment. In addition to the denial of
MFN treatment to certain countries restricting emigration, the Vanik
Amendment would deny the participation by any such country "in
any program of the government of the United States which extends
credits or credit guarantees or investment guarantees, directly or in-
directly."'"
In March 1974, when hearings upon the House-passed bill began
before the Senate Finance Committee, Secretary of State Kissinger
strongly opposed the Vanik Amendment (in the Senate it is also
known as the Jackson Amendment), as well as the denial of MFN
treatment written into H.R. 10710 by the House Ways and Means
.Committee.'6 As of the present (April 1974), Senate hearings are in
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
15. 119 CONG. REC. H8601-8603 (1973).
16. Id. at H8602.
17. Id. at H11027. See especially H11052-11064.
18. 2 Hearings on H.R. 10710 before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 454 (1974).
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progress, and the outcome is in doubt.'9
II. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Various estimates of the possible growth of U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade
have been made on the basis of diverse hypotheses. Given the devel-
opment of economic relations in a setting of political rapprochement,
Ray Cline, the former Director of the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, posited a theoretical calculation of growth
of U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. to be about $2 billion annually, with
Soviet imports amounting to $1.7 billion.2 0 According to Cline, the
achievement of such a volume of trade would "take quite a few
years," however, and the "creation of a more systematic division of
labor between the two countries."
What role does MFN status play in this kind of projection? A
study by the staff of the U.S. Tariff Commission' has indicated that
while tariff discrimination has "generally constituted less of a handi-
cap to U.S.S.R. trade than is commonly supposed," it nonetheless
adversely affected about 10 percent (based on value) of Soviet im-
ports in 1970. The study pointed out, however, that the traditional
trade pattern between the U.S.S.R. and the United States and "prob-
ably the deliberate actions of U.S. importers and Soviet foreign-trade
corporations, lead to a concentration in imports of the items which
avoid the full rates." And it further noted that there were a number
of Soviet products which might well experience growth in exportation
to the United States if MFN status were accorded, i.e.: plywood;
manganese ore; ferrovanadium; steel wire rods, plates, sheets, and
other shapes; metalworking equipment; hydrofoil boats; electrical-
generation equipment; cotton and man-made fibers; and apparel.2
Mere granting of MFN treatment would work no magic. Quality
goods, "reliable and fast installation and repair service,"2 3 and effec-
tive merchandising are necessary to lasting trade gains. Nonetheless,
it seems clear that continued denial of MFN treatment to Soviet
imports will impede the growth of Soviet-American trade. Con-
versely, MFN status for Soviet imports will assist the growth of U.S. -
U.S.S.R. trade in practical and in psychological ways. Denial of cred-
its and guarantees would exacerbate substantially such negative im-
pact upon Soviet-American trade relations.
19. For background on the Jackson-Vanik amendment, see supra Editor's Fore-
word, note 1.
20. Cline, Prospects for US.-Soviet Economic Relations, 69 DEP'T STATE BULL.
328, 334 (1973). For a generally more conservative assessment see: N. Y. Times, Nov.
5, 1973, at 61, col. 1.
21. Malish, United States Eastern European Trade, in 4 U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION
STAFF STUDIES (1972).
22 Id. at 44.
23. Cline, supra note 20, at 335.
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It is, of course, idle to expect that political considerations will
fail to affect decisions concerning the economic relations between the
United States and the U.S.S.R. What may be hoped is that the future
will represent an improvement over the past, to the benefit of the
peoples of both countries and of others. Such an improvement can
result to the extent that political considerations can be minimized,
and the development of trade relationships can proceed on the basis
of non-discrimination and comparative advantage in the production
and distribution of goods and services.
Editor's note: The present article was published in a revised form
in the INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL of the University of Mary-
land School of Law, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 79 (Spring, 1975).
